You can also check out [wireguard-install](https://github.com/angristan/wireguard-install), a simple installer for a simpler, safer, faster and more modern VPN protocol.
In your home directory, you will have `.ovpn` files. These are the client configuration files. Download them from your server and connect using your favorite OpenVPN client.
**PLEASE do not send me emails or private messages asking for help.** The only place to get help is the issues. Other people may be able to help and in the future, other users may also run into the same issue as you. My time is not available for free just for you, you're not special.
If the server is behind NAT, you can specify its endpoint with the `ENDPOINT` variable. If the endpoint is the public IP address which it is behind, you can use `ENDPOINT=$(curl -4 ifconfig.co)` (the script will default to this). The endpoint can be an IPv4 or a domain.
Other variables can be set depending on your choice (encryption, compression). You can search for them in the `installQuestions()` function of the script.
The headless install is more-or-less idempotent, in that it has been made safe to run multiple times with the same parameters, e.g. by a state provisioner like Ansible/Terraform/Salt/Chef/Puppet. It will only install and regenerate the Easy-RSA PKI if it doesn't already exist, and it will only install OpenVPN and other upstream dependencies if OpenVPN isn't already installed. It will recreate all local config and re-generate the client file on each headless run.
It's also possible to automate the addition of a new user. Here, the key is to provide the (string) value of the `MENU_OPTION` variable along with the remaining mandatory variables before invoking the script.
The following Bash script adds a new user `foo` to an existing OpenVPN configuration
Since 2016, the two scripts have diverged and are not alike anymore, especially under the hood. The main goal of the script was enhanced security. But since then, the script has been completely rewritten and a lot a features have been added. The script is only compatible with recent distributions though, so if you need to use a very old server or client, I advise using Nyr's script.
**A:** If possible, an official OpenVPN 2.4 client.
- Windows: [The official OpenVPN community client](https://openvpn.net/index.php/download/community-downloads.html).
- Linux: The `openvpn` package from your distribution. There is an [official APT repository](https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/OpenvpnSoftwareRepos) for Debian/Ubuntu based distributions.
**Q:** Am I safe from the NSA by using your script?
**A:** Please review your threat models. Even if this script has security in mind and uses state-of-the-art encryption, you shouldn't be using a VPN if you want to hide from the NSA.
We use [shellcheck](https://github.com/koalaman/shellcheck) and [shfmt](https://github.com/mvdan/sh) to enforce bash styling guidelines and good practices. They are executed for each commit / PR with GitHub Actions, so you can check the configuration [here](https://github.com/angristan/openvpn-install/blob/master/.github/workflows/push.yml).
If you want more information about an option mentioned below, head to the [OpenVPN manual](https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/Openvpn24ManPage). It is very complete.
Most of OpenVPN's encryption-related stuff is managed by [Easy-RSA](https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa). Defaults parameters are in the [vars.example](https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa/blob/v3.0.7/easyrsa3/vars.example) file.
By default, OpenVPN uses `BF-CBC` as the data channel cipher. Blowfish is an old (1993) and weak algorithm. Even the official OpenVPN documentation admits it.
> Using BF-CBC is no longer recommended, because of its 64-bit block size. This small block size allows attacks based on collisions, as demonstrated by SWEET32. See <https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/SWEET32> for details.
> Security researchers at INRIA published an attack on 64-bit block ciphers, such as 3DES and Blowfish. They show that they are able to recover plaintext when the same data is sent often enough, and show how they can use cross-site scripting vulnerabilities to send data of interest often enough. This works over HTTPS, but also works for HTTP-over-OpenVPN. See <https://sweet32.info/> for a much better and more elaborate explanation.
Indeed, AES is today's standard. It's the fastest and more secure cipher available today. [SEED](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEED) and [Camellia](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camellia_(cipher)>) are not vulnerable to date but are slower than AES and relatively less trusted.
> Of the currently supported ciphers, OpenVPN currently recommends using AES-256-CBC or AES-128-CBC. OpenVPN 2.4 and newer will also support GCM. For 2.4+, we recommend using AES-256-GCM or AES-128-GCM.
AES-256 is 40% slower than AES-128, and there isn't any real reason to use a 256 bits key over a 128 bits key with AES. (Source: [1](http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/14068/why-most-people-use-256-bit-encryption-instead-of-128-bit),[2](http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/6141/amount-of-simple-operations-that-is-safely-out-of-reach-for-all-humanity/6149#6149)). Moreover, AES-256 is more vulnerable to [Timing attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack).
AES-GCM is an [AEAD cipher](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption) which means it simultaneously provides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity assurances on the data.
OpenVPN 2.4 added a feature called "NCP": _Negotiable Crypto Parameters_. It means you can provide a cipher suite like with HTTPS. It is set to `AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM` by default and overrides the `--cipher` parameter when used with an OpenVPN 2.4 client. For the sake of simplicity, the script set both the `--cipher` and `--ncp-cipher` to the cipher chosen above.
> Authenticate data channel packets and (if enabled) tls-auth control channel packets with HMAC using message digest algorithm alg. (The default is SHA1 ). HMAC is a commonly used message authentication algorithm (MAC) that uses a data string, a secure hash algorithm, and a key, to produce a digital signature.
> If an AEAD cipher mode (e.g. GCM) is chosen, the specified --auth algorithm is ignored for the data channel, and the authentication method of the AEAD cipher is used instead. Note that alg still specifies the digest used for tls-auth.
> In a nutshell, --tls-auth enables a kind of "HMAC firewall" on OpenVPN's TCP/UDP port, where TLS control channel packets bearing an incorrect HMAC signature can be dropped immediately without response.
